tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3736365491401043672.post6339534010476144245..comments2008-05-19T06:45:54.430-04:00Anderson Brownhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18358008464457746997noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3736365491401043672.post-283243843527221432008-05-18T22:44:00.000-04:002008-05-18T22:44:00.000-04:00Anderson,<BR/><BR/>I like your overview here quite a bit, but I have to note regarding the notion of Rorty's "end of objectivity rhetoric," that later in life Rorty made a serious concession both to "objectivity" and to Donald Davidson (who also was quite influenced by Wittgenstein's Public Language Argument). Their over a decade long dispute over whether there need be a theory of truth, reached its resolution when Bjorn Ramberg wrote his "Post-ontological Philosophy of Mind", which convinced Rorty that for all these years he had not properly understood just what Davidson was arguing--and for that matter, perhaps one could say Wittgenstein. <BR/><BR/>Rorty came to the conclusion that indeed there must be a sense of "getting it right" (a prescriptive normativity) and that this was what "truth" was, helping constitute the "objective" leg of the knowledge triangle. The two essays which trace this remarkable reversal, Ramberg's own, and Rorty's response, can be found in the Book "Rorty and His Critics", if you haven't seen it. I might say that it is easy to use Rorty as the symbol of the high crimes of Relativism, for he often positioned himself there at the edge intentionally, but I find this late reversal on his part to be one of them more honest examples of modern philosophical re-evaluation.<BR/><BR/><BR/>kvondkvondhttp://kvond.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.com